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Abstract
The human-technology relationship may be helpful or hannful tor human life. and
technologies may be conceived in terms of tools and prostheses. Prostheses replace
something the human is lacking. while tools enable. Contemporary technological society
promotes prosthetic dependency by privileging the machine over the human. and
consequently judging the human by the standards of the machine. Prostheses. when not
converted to tools. may hinder human life by inhibiting the individual's ability to
experience the world. Prosthesis. as a substitute for experience and personal j udgmenl.
potentially endangers personhood.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Technological innovation and intervention have become one of the central foci of
the Western world. Technology. a major factor in the struggle towards resolution of
several human problems (health. food. shelter. transportation. communication. and
creation) has altered. and in many ways made more secure. our material conditions. This
has lead to the contemporary conception that modem technology is the best achievement
of humanity. There is. however. a common misconception that it is technological. rather
than human. power. which has altered the world. Praising instruments. rather than the
human beings and society which construct and use them. serves to obscure the function
of technology. By undervaluing human intentions we misconceive the technological in
terms ofagency. thereby creating conditions whereby humans are judged by
technologicaL rather than human. standards.
It will be the task of this work to examine the social assumptions upon which
human relationships with technology are based. and how the type of relationship which
exists between humans and technologies influences whether particular technologies are
helpful or harmful for human life and personal action. The focus will be on how the way
in which ethical decisions are thought to be made. affects the human relationship with
technology. More specifically. it will be argued that the social propagation of the belief
that ethical decisions are primarily based upon rationality encourages the reduction of
humans to technological considerations.
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Technological judgement of humans will be shown to be supported by those
philosophies that place the intellect specifically rationality. as primary in the decision
making process. This approach to action sees the machine as functioning more rationally
than the human since machines and techniques are uninhibited by attachments to contexts
which are signified in emotions and are thereby considered less error prone. A
consequence of this view is that humans are seen to be in need of prosthetic alteration in
order to approach the perfection of the mechanical. When the machine is the paradigm.
then human subjectivity. uniqueness. and judgement are viewed as flawed or unfit.
Humans. then. "need" a prosthesis in order to properly function in a technical realm.
This perceived and enforced need for prosthetic alteration of the human is most prevalent
in the realm of work.
Prosthetic dependency. currently much encouraged. transfonns the person into
someone desirable in tenns of the standards and norms of technological society. Rather
than fostering a diversity of personal capacities and attributes. prostheses are used to
replace these with a more homogenous set:
Dominant scientific knowledge thus breeds a monoculture of the mind by making
space for local alternatives disappear. very much like monocultures of induced
plant varieties leading to the displacement and destruction of local diversity.
Dominant knowledge also destroys the very conditions for alternatives to exist.
very much like the introduction of monocultures destroying the very conditions
tor diverse species to exist. l
The superlative conception of technology closes off the arena in which consideration ofa
diversity of ways of doing things exists. This has the effect of hindering personal
development because the human judgement is rendered unnecessary. and obsolete.
.,
-
Tools. in contrast to prostheses. enable human action. They are useful to our lives
as social individuals. A tool is ditTerent from a prosthesis as tools require the exercise of
human judgement. based on experience. We use tools to engage with the world. and
prostheses when we allow ourselves to be acted upon because of a perceived lack. For
example. a telephone answering machine enables the communication. storage. and
retrieval of messages. It may be used to enhance or avoid social contacts. In these
respects the telephone answering machine is a tool. This same technology. however. may
be ccnsidered a prosthesis if it is acquired because the individual perceives it as necessary
to make up for some kind of lack. such as never being at home. The telephone answering
machine. as a prosthesis. acts upon the individual by changing the structure of their life.
They may now be reached at any time. whether they are at home or not. and upon
returning home they have access to all the messages left that were recorded while they
were away. These messages may be a welcome surprise. or a factor contributing to
stress. It is these alterations of life that prostheses bring that need to be evaluated. and
perhaps re-structured for technologies to become tools. The significance of the
distinction is that technology may provoke human judgement. or stifle it. Tools belong to
a human realm. whereas prostheses can place the human in a technical realm. When an
individual takes up with a technology because they perceive themselves to be lacking.
and if this prosthesis is encouraged by. because useful to. a technical system. then the
individual is being adapted to a technical end. Cellular phones may be seen as prostheses
in that individuals lack the ability to communicate over long distances from almost any
location. and these telephones make up for this inability. or inadequacy. They become
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tools. however. when the individual who has acquired the phone integrates it into the
structure of their life by making judgements as to when to carry it. when to tum it on. and
when to use it. These judgements are hased on the consideration ofa wide range of
consequences of the technology. John Dewey's interpretation of the human plane is
illustrative of the process by which technologies become tools:
When appetite is perceived in its meanings. in the consequences it
induces. and these consequences are experimented with in reflective
imagination. some being seen to be consistent with one another. and hence
capable of co-existence and of serially ordered achievement. others being
incompatible. forbidding conjunction at one time. and getting in one
another's way serially - when this estate is attained. we live on a human
plane. responding to things in their meanings. A relationship of cause-
effect has been transformed into one of means-consequence.:!
When we live on a human plane our actions are considered. and our technologies are
tools. We do not live on a human plane when we allow ourselves to be prosthetically
altered without insight into the values and broad consequences of this alteration.
Technologies are useful or not depending on how well they fit within the lives of
the persons using them. Prostheses are those technologies which alter the person's life in
such a way as to adapt the person to a given set of circumstances. Prostheses are
detrimental when they serve to adapt the person to the technology or the technological
system, promoting a disregard for the higher significance of the life.
[t will be shown that striving towards a mechanical ideal blocks the human
emotional capacity. making personal orientation by way of co-creation and development
less possible. Human beings ingest a mechanism manufactured by technological society
and it is that mechanism, prosthesis. that causes them to adapt themselves to the machine
(the system of technological society) willingly. Humans become instruments. and do so
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willingly because the instrument has become the measure ofgood. Technological
society. being unable to see beyond itself. is unable to see a higher value than utility.
Humans need technology. but at what point does technology become hannful
rather than helpful? Philosophical queries into the concept of need have a long history in
Western Philosophy. At least since Plato philosophers have wondered about what need
is. where it is located. and whether or not the needs of individuals are compatible with the
needs of societies. The following work is connected with these problems. and though
they will not be tackled directly readers should note that it is those sorts of questions that
form the larger substratum of the investigation into the impact of technology on human
life.
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Chapter 2: Tools and Prostheses
"For individuals the means a/power act as prostheses which weaken the natural use of
junctions...3
Prosthesis and Lack
Prosthesis is the tenn used for an artificial adjunct to the body. intended to make
up for some missing or inadequate part." In this definition of prosthesis we should pay
specific attention to the tenn "inadequacy." The evaluative notions of adequacy and
inadequacy detennine whether prosthesis is appropriate or not. Prosthesis as the addition
of a mechanism or device to the individual. could also be conceived as the alteration of
individual via a teclmique. What we nonnally call a prosthesis. in the medical sense. an
artificial limb. for example. becomes a tool when the person to which it is attached learns
to use it to walk. Learning to walk with an artificial attachment is the process of
appropriation which turns the attachment from prosthesis to tool. Tools are what we use
to aid us in our activities. Prostheses. when left unchecked. are used in order to make
humans more mechanical; they may restrain and constrain us to a technical. rather than
human. end.
We may see the distinction between tools and prostheses in tenns ofa continuum.
This differentiation is based on the relationships between the individual. the technology.
and the world. The status of the technology may be detennined by examining the
intentionality of the individual in their relationship with the technology. Technologies
such as glasses or contact lenses are used to make up for optic deficiencies. and as such
are prostheses. They become more tool-like. however. when they are appropriated by the
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individual through incorporation. Decisions about style. as well as when and how to
wear these technologies are part of the process of making technologies tools. We work
with our tools. and prostheses work for us.
Tools are enabling. We use tools to work. to engage in ··...purposive action.
guided by intelligence...5 Prostheses are technologies whose capacities we require. but do
not have. A person with an injured leg may require the support ofa splint~ the splint has
the strength that the leg lacks. A person with poor eyesight may require artificial lenses
in order to see. Many more technologies may function as prostheses. depending on what
we perceive ourselves to be lacking. Cars. computers. photographic images. schools. and
machines of various sorts can classify as prostheses when the individual is. or perceives
themselves to be. lacking in the capacities which these various techniques and
technologies otTer. Tools are what we use as whole beings. prostheses are operative
when we lack.
The medical realm can provide us with an illustration of the problem of
prostheses. (n contemporary society there is a widespread conception that medical
practices are universal and absolute. and people thereby accept the prescriptions of the
medical establishment as if their worth was generally determined. But the value of the
continued multiplication of medical interventions may no longer be in the best interests
of health. (van lllich argues that the ··...positive contribution of modern medicine to
individual health during the early part of the twentieth century can hardly be
questioned..:' but "[t]rust in miracle cures [has] obliterated good sense and traditional
wisdom on healing and health care..,6 When medicine as a prosthesis becomes a
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replacement for the good sense of individuals. then it is detrimental to individual and
social life.
For example. most medical treatments are tools of the doctor. but prostheses for
others. Doctors are trained to understand the interaction between symptom. illness. and
treatment. This knowledge enables them to practice the treatment of illnesses. Doctors'
tools. such as diagnostic devices and drugs. are prostheses for those in need of them. The
sick individual may be dependent upon the tools of the doctor. There is nothing 'WTong
with this prosthetic relation. but it is dangerous. Failing to recognize the danger of this
relationship potentially damages personal judgement.
The point at which prosthesis becomes problematic is difficult to ascertain and
can only be detennined by way ofcontextual judgement. Varying degrees and kinds of
prosthetic dependence exist for each person. In the case of medicine. the difficulty can
be seen when an individual surrenders their personal notions of health. and adopts the
prescriptions of the medical establishment as law. truth. and necessity
Prosthetic medical treatment can become a tool for the sick individual. however.
when it enables them to understand the conditions of their illness better. The knowledge
of the medical establishment becomes a tool when one uses it to complement one's
personal notion of health. The knowledge may be questioned. judged. rejected. altered.
or adopted. The greater the range of possibilities of use. the more tool-like technologies
become. Alteration of lifestyle is one manner ofdealing with a variety of illnesses.
drugs are another. In contemporary society there is a tendency towards the prosthetic use
of pharmaceutical drugs. as people believe themselves to be lacking in things that the
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drugs provide them. Persons need not be free of prostheses. but they cannot be
completely dependent on them either. The degree of prosthetic dependence is an
individual determination made within a context. The point is that prosthesis should not
go unexamined.
One concern with prostheses is that there is a greater emphasis on the alteration of
a person's self than on an alteration of the world. or of the person's place within the
world. Where a tool is a part of a person's action in the world. prosthesis is an act of the
perceived world onto the person: it is the internalization of \vhat is considered law. nOnTI.
or authority. Stephen Rose illustrates this problematic in regards to psychochemical
drugs:
The real threat of psychochemicals is a ... subtle one. After all. one may not
require the spraying ofchemicals from the air. or their dropping into the water
supply. if the people can be sufficiently accustomed to regard the right
response to any type of psychic distress as to obtain a prescription from a doctor
for a chemical to put it right; if society is so conditioned that a substantial
proportion of its members regard their sensations of pain in relation to that of
society. not as a sign of society being out ofjoint. but of they themselves being
clinically ill ... With drugs to sleep and to wake. to sedate and alert. to ease pain
and to generate joy. we have already arrived at one form of Bra,,'/! New World. in
which the medical profession. and in particular psychiatrists. act as lieutenants in
the campaign for the preservation of the status quo.7
When. in the face of unhealthy social conditions. individuals forego personal and social
evaluation for a drug. then this drug is a negative form of prosthesis in that it is serving to
replace their sensibilities. The problem is not so much whether or not the individual
takes the drug. but the process used in deciding whether or not to take the drug. The
more narrowly individuals and societies conceive possibilities. the more harmful
prosthetics will be.
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Richard DeGrandpre titles this fonn ofdrug use "prosthetic phannacolof:,')':'s One
of the probiems he sees with it is that drugs. such as Ritalin. make it ··...easier to live
under ... unhealthy conditions..:·q In his experience in working with parents of children
who have been labeled as Attention Deficit Disordered. a deficiency he believes has
social and cultural causes more often than biological ones. he has found
... the realm of possibilities imagined to be narrow. since parents. teachers.
administrators. and physicians have been encoura~ed to believe that the structure
of the child's life is not related to these problems. 0
Rather than work to remedy what may be a situational problem. a prosthesis is used to
adapt the child to that very situation. Further. the belief of these parents. teachers.
administrators. and physicians could be viewed as a prosthesis as it is the result of the
internalization of what they consider authority. and a replacement for their evaluation of
the situation.
Prostlresis as tire ingestion oftire wi/l ofanotlrer
We all internalize and are co-constituted by things which we perceive in the
world. but there is a distinction between what we understand in the world. and hence
allow to penetrate us. and what we simply take as law. or nonn. To internalize a law or a
nonn without insight into its value is a denial of our sensibility. Prosthesis compromises
personhood when there is an inability to recognize. in the internalization of images.
standards. and norms. that we are ingesting the will of another in the service of a
technical end or objective. rather than a personal goal.
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Machine as Measure ofthe Human
Prostheses are supplementary organs. in the sense that they are used as substitutes
for pre-existing human capabilities. Prosthetic alteration is often seen as intending and
achieving an "improvement." or "normalization." of the individual. It is our contention
that prosthesis does not always enhance. but can diminish. the capabilities of the human.
The detrimental effects of prosthesis occur when the machine is seen as the measure of
the human. When the machine is the measure. when the organ is viewed by analogy with
the tool. II the human is seen as lacking and in need of alteration. prosthesis. in order to
approach the adequacy of the mechanical. When prosthesis occurs as a result of the
normativity of the machine. the technology is being used on the individual. rather than by
them.
R. Boguslaw illustrates one way in which humans are measured by the standards
of the machine:
What we need is an inventory of the manner in which human behaviour can be
controlled. and a description of some of the instruments which will help us
achieve that control. If this provides us with sufficient handles on human
materials so that we can think of them as metal parts. electrical power or chemical
reactions, then we have succeeded in placing human material on the same footing
as any other material and can begin to proceed with our problems of systems
design. There are. however, many disadvantages in the use of these human
operating units. They are somewhat fragile. they are subject to fatigue.
obsolescence. disease and even death. They are frequently stupid. unreliable and
limited in memory capacity. But beyond all this. they sometimes seek to design
their own circuitry. This in a material is unforgivable. and any system utilising
them must devise appropriate safeguards. 12
Among the disadvantages of using living humans, Boguslaw lists three characteristics:
fatigue. disease, and death. He disparages the human tendency to design. The inclination
I I
to "design one's own circuitry' is an example of the human tendency towards tool-use
and is suggestive of imagination: the ability to see another way.
Max: Scheler sees such developments in a more gen~ral manner in terms oforgans
and tools. Modern society. he argues. views the organ by analogy with the tool: the
living by way of the dead. dead matter. This view seeks to reduce the processes offife to
the mechanical in order to achieve control. For Scheler. this modern worldview is the
result of ressentiment (a term he borrows from Nietzsche): which views the
...organism as a fortuitous adaptation to a fixed dead milieu. The eye is
explained by analogy with spectacles. the hand by analogy with the spade. the
organ by analogy with the tool! No wonder the mechanical civilization - which is
always the result ofa relative stagnation in vital activity and therefore a surrogate
for the formation of organs - is mistaken for the triumph. continuation. and
extension of vital activity. Thus the infinite "progress" of mechanical civilization
becomes the true "goal" ofall vital activity. and the infinite development of the
calculating intellect is made the "meaning" of life. 13
Scheler argues that this view of the world. and specifically of the organ. is false because
it mistakes the image for the thing itself. I" When society places human life in the service
of technical development and application. human needs are not satisfied.
Social propagation of""man lack
Prostheses are operative when we lack. It is by an extension of the notion of lack
that prostheses tend towards being used by elements of society for social control. The
more prosthesis is emphasized over tool use, the fewer people consider. or are able to
affect. a transformation in personal and social conditions. The more reliant people
become on prosthetic technologies offered by society the less imaginative they will be
when it comes to social possibilities.
12
To consider another example. in the realm ofarchitecture the computer may take
the fonn of both tool and prosthesis. Mike Cooley argues that Computer Assisted Design
(CAD) could be used to involve a greater spectrum of people in the decision-making
process. Computer systems that produce accurate three dimensional representations of an
object on the screen. prior to its construction. could be used to make spatial planning
more public. For example. "A visual display such as the one described could be made of
any proposed municipal building. and local people could be involved in deciding whether
they approved of its design and its 10cation:· I ; Instead CAD is often being used as .....a
tool for silencing the common sense and creativity of the skilled worker on the shop
floor:· 16 One of his concerns about the use ofcomputers in the design process is that the
··... feel for the physical world about us is becoming an abstraction from the real world:· 17
Although one might think that these computer usages would augment human creativity
and therefore be an example of beneficial prostheses. Cooley advises that this is not the
case:
The complex communications that go on between human beings during problem
solving activities are being distanced by the computer and by the systems
interfacing the people with the computer... 18
The computer is being used in ways that breakdown interrelations between persons and
between persons and places. The designer no longer needs to go to the site where the
building is being constructed. but can rather check on the progress via a computer
display. "The designer's drawings will be transmitted through telephone lines and then
displayed on the screen so the physical contact between the designer and the site is cut
out:·19 The computer may increase efficiency, but at the cost of skill. creativity.
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attachment to context. and personal interrelations. When technology is used as a
substitute for these elements it may be seen to be a prosthesis rather than a tool. In this
case. it is not a tool of the designers because it is not enabling them to excel at their work.
but is rather detaching them from some of the most fulfilling elements of it. This form of
prosthesis is harmful when it is the cause of deskilling and declining sensibility. when it
inhibits personal judgment. Cooley equates this use of the computer with Western
thought~ "The crude introduction ofcomputers into the design activity in keeping with
the Western ethic ·the faster the better" may well result in a plummeting quality of
design:·20
Prosthesis may serve technical ends
[van lIIich argues that society and its members are increasingly put in the service
of the technical end of industrial productivity. and that modem technology is a major
component of this servitude. When individuals are encouraged to see themselves as
lacking in comparison with machines. then prosthetic dependence is promoted. and this
dependence serves industrial productivity rather than conviviality. lIIich presents an
historical analysis of modem technology and explains it in terms of two watersheds:
At first. new knowledge is applied to the solution ofa clearly stated problem and
scientific measuring sticks are applied to account for the new efficiency. But at a
second point. the progress demonstrated in a previous achievement is used as a
rationale for the exploitation of society as a whole in the service of a value which
is determined and constantly revised by an element ofsociety. by one of its selt:
certifying elites.21
Prosthesis, in its detrimental form. is useful for those members of society who stand to
-
profit from mass prosthetic dependence. When the majority of society's members
replace their personal goals with technical objectives and do not recognize whose
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interests this serves. then their prosthetic dependence will only strengthen those that
•
encourage It.
Cooley's analysis is similar to lllich·s. in that he highlights the fact that
technology often does not serve the social objectives which its designers had intended:
Regrettably. the history of scientific and technological innovation is strewn with
dramatic examples which contrast the dedicated and socially desirable objectives
of the academic or researcher with the cynical exploitation of their ingenuity at
the level of application by the owners of the means of production. Hence we find
in many fields ofendeavour a significant gap between that which technology
could provide (its potential) and this which it does provide (its reality).:!:!
Cooley's concern is that if the historical moment is not understood then a technological
course could be pursued that would close ofT possibilities for more human organisational
forms:
This is likely to be accompanied by the subordination of the operator (designer) to
the machine (computer). with the narrow specialisation of Taylorism leading to
the fragmentation ofdesign skills and a loss of panoramic view of the design
activity itself. In consequence. standard routines and optimisation techniques may
seriously limit the creativity of the designer because the subjective value
judgements would be dominated by the "objective" decisions of the system.:!]
Tools and conviviality
New technologies are often ushered in by society as proof of"progress:' and as
an illustration of the power of the human. Because of this conceptualization of
technology as progress. and of progress as good. the technologies themselves are not
questioned. and they are quickly implemented with little. if any. attention being given to
potential consequences. Their application is thought. inevitably. to make things
(whatever they may be) "better:' When employed in this unreflective manner
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technology threatens the very things it is believed it will enhance. This is not a necessary
condition of new technologies, but neverthele~s this often occurs because of
contemporary society's unquestioning stance towards technology generally. Society
needs to become more adept at ascertaining the wider scope of technologies.
We may contrast technological society, which encourages prosthetic dependence,
with llIich's notion of convivial society which encourages tool use. Convivial society
implies:
...autonomous and creative intercourse among persons. and the intercourse of
persons with their environment: and this in contrast with the conditioned response
of persons to the demands made upon them by others. and by a man-made
. .,~
environment.-
He sees conviviality as ,... .individual freedom realized in personal interdependence and.
as such, an intrinsic ethical value.',25 We may see in llIich's notion that conviviality
stresses interdependencies. developed through interaction. as intrinsic to personhood:
they are displaced by technological society's application of techniques to life.
A convivial society would limit the growth of some technologies while at the
same time developing new and more socially appropriate technologies. IIlich sees that
technology can be inhibiting of personal experience and consequently detrimental to
creativity. (fwe are to maintain our inter-connectivity then we need to recognize that:
A microphone is not an ear, a camera is not an eye and a computer is not a brain.
We should not allow ourselves to be so wrapped up in the technology that we fail
to assert the importance of human beings.26
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Chapter 3: Emotional Experience and Ethics
We orient ourselves within the world by way of values: ··[tJhere is an apriori urdre till
I . d .•27coeur. or oglque u coeur....
There has been much speculation in contemporary society about the replacement
of humans by machines and the prospects ofartificial intelligence. Our concern.
however. is less with the possibilities of making machines more human. than the ways we
may be making humans more machine-like. When the machine is seen to embody
perfection. in comparison the human is seen as lacking: a desire is created. thereby. to
alter the human in such a way so as to approach the perfection of the mechanical. The
machine. following a strictly cause-effect schematic and more susceptible to explanation
and manipulation. is the model. which the human is meant to imitate. Explanation is
privileged over understanding. The machine. amenable to human comprehension as the
result of human invention. is thought to be what the human should endeavour to imitate:
it is believed that the machine is the ultimate expression of humanity. our best
achievement. The machine has moved from the position of tool to that of model. or prime
example. of what it means to be human.
The machine is an expression of the calculating intellect. Much modem thought
has taken the intellect. specifically the calculating aspect. to be the highest and most
important element of the human. This type of human rationality encourages the
proliferation of technology and the overthrow of "irrational" metaphysics. Instrumental
rationality now gets employed widely in the name of progress: the more the world comes
to be viewed as a human construct embodying reason. the more the individual human is
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expected to confonn to the standards created by the machine. In the 'Nords of Jacques
Ellul. "[w]e begin with a philosophical conviction about human nature and we come back
to an ethical command to identify ourselves with the universe we have created.,,28 In this
way the machine becomes the measure for human conduct. Because the machine is
thought to be the most perfect expression of the human it is thought that the human
should closely resemble the machine.
The Enlightenment attempted to 'Wrest humans from the confines of a
metaphysical system which gave them a place within nature. thus subordinating them to
nature as a whole or the cosmos. Religious metaphysics was dismantled by a mechanistic
worldview. which was seen to be more conducive to human liberty as it no longer
stretched beyond the realm of the human in order to justify itself. Instead. mechanism
reduces everything to the framework of the human. Nature becomes that which is subject
to humans. raw material for their use.
Humans are not only a part of the natural world: they have nature within them.
Only reason. it was thought. was separate from nature as it alone was capable of
possessing and controlling nature. making the natural world conform to the purposes of
the human. Thus. although humans have nature within them they may use their intellect.
their reason. to control both nature within them and nature outside of them. The
affectivity of humans. the ability to be affected emotionally. is considered in some cases
bad. but in all cases subordinate. to the intellect.
A consequence of regarding the emotions as insignificant to ethics is that the
impact that techniques and technologies have on actual people is often overlooked. since.
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from a theoretical perspective that sees humans solely in terms ofan instrumentalist
rationality. if a technique or technology is more efficient for performing an operation.
then it is better than what currently exists and its application or use will inevitably make
the situation "better:' This "rationalization" of decisions is the result ofa misconception
of what persons are. and what technologies are for. When conceived in this fashion.
technologies become prostheses. In order to illustrate this problematic approach to
decisions regarding the use of technologies we will develop a view which not only
includes the emotions within the process of ethical judgement. but affirms emotional
• •
expenence as pnmary
Decisions about action are widely thought. in our contemporary Western society.
to originate in rational thought or intellectual cognition. Phenomenologists often contest
this point. and assert that knowledge of what actions to perform originates in emotional
experience. These thinkers include Franz Brentano. Alexius Meinong. Max Scheler. and
John Dewey. Each argues that it is through emotional experience that we learn which
actions we should perform.
In technological society we see the subordination of the emotions to rationality
and the consequent de-legitimating of the importance of the emotions to ethical activity.
When an individual attempts to repress their emotions. they block their capacity to
experience value. hence negatively affecting their ability to orient themselves in the
world. Persons orient themselves by way of love and hate; if we deny this basic function
of the emotions then we deny that we each have our own places in the world and actions
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and directions specific to us. Seeing the human as rational first and foremost makes
humans too much the same. leaving little room for uniqueness. except in "flaw:'
Viewing the emotions as a primary factor in the detennination of ethical
comportment allows us to recognize the uniqueness of persons and situations. Rather
than seeing ethics as moving from the universal to the particular. i.e. from ethical
prescription to act. we move in the other direction. Intuition of values occurs through
emotional experience. according to the predominant tradition in phenomenology. Values
are not created or produced: rather. they are felt and exist independently of the person
who feels them and the objects in which they are perceived to inhere. Recognizing that it
is through the emotions that we experience value and that the experience of values
informs action allows us to see that the capacity to sense is of the utmost importance to
ethical comportment. Persons are connected to contexts by way of values. Emotional
experience and action are continuous within context. A rationalistic approach to ethics
does not account for the value of connections between persons. and between persons and
places. An ethics of this sort is in line with a mechanistic worldview. which is unable to
account for the connection between persons and nature except via control. Seeing that
emotional experience informs action enables us (0 understand that the will to control
originates in an experience of value.
We may get a clearer understanding of this approach to ethics if we examine
Scheler's critique of Kant. Scheler credits Kant with having .....refuted. once and for alL
all ethics starting with the question. What is the highest good. or what is the final purpose
ofall volitional conations?,,19 Nevertheless, Scheler sees Kant's ethics as erroneous in
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the insistence on establishing a moral ought~ Kant begins in the wrong place. namely.
with necessity. Scheler claims that necessity ofoughtness is itself grounded in the
"insight into a priori interconnections obtaining among values:·3o Scheler posits the first
step in ethics as the achievement of insight into the "a priori structure of the realm of
values:'] ( His approach to ethics begins with value-perception. or affection. He claims
that the fonnalistic approach to ethics. which posits the person as rational agent. "reveals
its implicit material assumption that the person is basically nothing but a logical subject
of rational acts.·.32 The problem with this approach. according to Scheler. is that it then
presents ethics as if rational activity were the sole component. since it claims that it is the
essence of personhood.
Far from proposing that the person is not rational. Scheler thinks we should view
the person as the totality of their being. which includes rationality and afTection. Scheler
contends that a person cannot. as Kant suggests. become a person through obedience to a
rational law since personhood precedes the possibility for obedience. Obedience itself
must be based upon insight. as an action which is willed without insight does not belong
to the person:]]
One who renders obedience wills "to obey"; i.e.• the positive act of obeying
becomes an immediate volitional project in which the willing of what is
commanded is fonned. A distinct awareness of the difference between one's own
and another's willing "as" that of another, is the necessary condition of genuine
obeying.3-1
Obedience is an autonomous act of will that follows the insight ofanother. but is itself
based upon the ··...insight that the person giving the order possesses a higher degree of
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moral insight than we do:·J5 In order for obedience to have moral relevance it must
follow from the insight into the value of the commander's insight.
If we assume. along with Scheler. that human action is not based solely. or even
primarily. upon rationality. then we may propose that we orient ourselves in the world
firstly through our senses and only secondly. abstractly. with rational insight. Just as we
sense colour through seeing we sense values through feeling. or .....values are given in
feeling..:·J6 The capacity to sense values is important to ethics as it enables the insight
which is necessary for ethical action. It is upon our sense of values that moral
imperatives are based. The less capable we are ofsensing values the less appropriate will
be our actions:
Moral willing and. indeed. moral comportment have their foundation in this
value-cognition...• with its own a priori content and its o"n evidence. in such a
fashion that every willing (indeed. every conation) is primarily directed toward
the realization ofa value given in these acts.J7
Dewey's interest in emotional experience is quite similar to Scheler's: emotional
experience is participatory activity:
For emotion in its ordinary sense is something called out by objects. physical and
personal: it is response to an objective situation. It is not something existing
somewhere by itself which then employs material through which to express itself.
Emotion is an indication of intimate participation. in a more or less excited way in
some scene of nature or life: it is. so to speak. an attitude or disposition. which is a
function ofobjective things.J8
Emotions derive their significance from their connection with the objective world.
Emotions. as indicators of participation. signify the action of the individual within a
context. or environment. Attention to the importance of the emotions to ethical
considerations. then. is inclusive of the context. however unique. which called out those
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emotions.
When philosophy rejects affect as a directive for action. the technical is easily
valued over the human because context is more easily ignored. Without an understanding
of the role that the affections play in personal orientation there is no way of accounting
for the importance ofcontext to human life. When context is ignored then all that is
unique and particular goes unnoticed and technical efficiency appears as most valuable.
Since we look for explanations rather than understanding. we rely on the rational and
reduce everything to a mechanistic schema. In this way. then. the functioning of a
machine makes more "sense:' because it is explicable rationally. than the actions of
persons. Rationalism gives priority to (problems ot) criteria and thereby privileges the
technical over the personal:
He who is always inclined to ask for a criterion first of all - a criterion of whether
this picture is an authentic work of art. say. or whether any extant religion is true
and which one it is - is a man who stands outside. who has no dire,'t contact with
any work ofart. any religion. any scientific domain.39
Giving priority to criteria is a product of Enlightenment thought; ··... for the enlightenment
the process is always decided from the start:""'o To decide the process from the start is to
ignore the particular. which is made manifest through experience. When criteria are
given priority technique is priveleged. This can be seen as a result of disembodied
rationality, rationality divorced from personal experience and thereby separate from
context.
Disembodied rationality leads to the belief that the affective experiences of the
individual are negative factors in determining the actions that they perform. Further. it
leads to a rejection of the individual's relationships and interdependencies. It presents the
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individual as de-contextualized. and promotes the idea that the context in which the
individual lives is irrelevant. ContexL however. is profoundly relevant to individuals.
and is only presented as irrelevant when standardization is desired. Persons live in
contexts and it is through contexts wherein values are perceived. De-contextualization is
synonymous with de-personalization. and both enable standardization. Standardization
cannot account for subjectivity.
Dewey contends that to see rationality as the sole influence upon action is to
disconnect nature and experience:
When intellectual experience and its material are taken to be primary. the cord
that binds experience and nature is cut. That the physiological organism with its
structures. whether in man or in the lower animals. is concerned with making
adaptations and uses of material in the interest of maintenance of the life-process.
cannot be denied. The brain and nervous system are primarily organs of action-
undergoing; biologically. it can be asserted that primary experience is ofa
corresponding type. Hence. unless there is breach of historic and natural
continuity. cognitive experience must originate within that of a non-cognitive
.$1
sort.
Emotional experience is part ofour participation in our environment: the fact that we are
affected shows that we have participated. If. because of technical restraint or mediation.
we are less affected by situations in which we are involved. then we are participating less.
becoming passive and isolated. rather than active and inter-connected. Our emotional
experience serves as material for conceptualizations of moral imperatives. When.
however. cognitive experience. such as the conceptualization of moral-oughts. does not
originate in emotional experience then there is a breach in continuity. We may
understand this to mean that if an individual's conception of what to do originates from
cognitive experience without guidance or prompting from emotional experience. then
24
they are unable to recognize a continuation of their experience in their actions.
Conformity to social norms is sometimes due to this sort of breach. and when it is the
individual is not acting as a person.
Scheler thinks that we learn the reasons for our actions not through obedience to
a rational law but through experience. specifically experiences of value.~:! Any ethic
which devalues emotions simultaneously devalues persons. as it is through emotions that
persons experience their lives as valuable. and understand the value of others. Scheler's
value theory attributes priority to values. rather than to facts. He claims that a doctrine of
values and the doctrine of logic stand side by side. and that the emotions have a priori
contents. Values precede factual conceptions and are signified in feeling. Scheler holds
that the value ofa thing comes to experience before the thing itself: and that the value is
independent of the thing. "Goods" may change over time and with respect to different
people. but values do not. In other words. a rose may be considered lovely by some. and
ugly by others. but the values of beauty and ugliness themselves are static and are
maintained. regardless of what they are perceived to inhere in. h is in this way that
Scheler is able to claim that there exists an objective hierarchy of values. This order of
ranks of values. or hierarchy of values. consists. from highest to lowest. of: the holy.
spiritual. vital. and sensuous values. Holy values and spiritual values belong to the realm
of the person. while values of life and sensuous values belong to life. From this it should
be noted that the higher values do not cancel out the lower values. but take precedence
over them. Ideally all values have their proper order and relations to each other.
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Through a detailed examination ofScheler"s value theory we will see that
contemporary society. in privileging utility over vitality. threatens the possibility for
moral action through proliferation of prostheses. Values of utility. according to Scheler.
refer to sensuous values. or enforce vital values. If they do not do this. then they are not
properly values at alI:u This faIse ranking is termed value-deception by Scheler. and is
deceptive in two ways. Firstly. values of utility belong to the lowest realm of values. and
can therefore never properly be valued over the higher values oflife. "Every value of
utility is a value 'for' a living being. Something is 'usefur if it is a controllable cause for
the realization of a good that is agreeable to the senses:..... And secondly. values of utility
are never valuable in themselves. but only insofar as they refer to sensuous or vital
values.
In contemporary society we are constant witnesses to this value deception. It can
be seen in the apotheosis of technology and notions of "progress" as goods in and for
themselves. This poor sight is further illustrated by the physical illnesses which result
from our technologically "enhanced" lifestyles. In industry and in everyday life
machines create pollution that contributes to a variety of physical illnesses. Cleaning
fluids are carcinogenic. car exhaust causes respiratory illness. cell phones have been
linked with cancer. pesticides alter the human endocrine system. and antibiotics weaken
resistance to infections. When we judge the utility of these various technologies as more
important than the cost of vitality then we are commining a value deception. When we
evaluate these technologies we should consider their utility for vitality.
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The problem with this inversion of the rank of values is one of scale. It has
become generally understood that utility is the highest value. This ··...perversion of the
hierarchy of values..: 045 is the result ofa modem morality. wherein
...the merchants and representatives of industry came to dominate[:J ... their
judgments. tastes. and inclinations became the selective detenninants ofcultural
production even in its intellectual and spiritual aspectS.-I6
The values of the merchant and the industrialist are not problematic per se. but what is an
issue is that ··...the qualities that enable this particular type of man to do business. are set
up as generally mlid (indeed the 'highest") moral mhles.'047 When the values of the
merchant and the industrialist are taken to be generally valid. then all members of society
are encouraged to orient themselves by way of the business interests ofa small sector of
society.
This type of value deception. according to Scheler. results from ressentiment:
...a self-poisoning of the mind which has quite definite causes and consequences.
It is a lasting mental attitude. caused by the systematic repression ofcertain
emotions and affects. which. as such. are nonnal components of human nature.
Their repression leads to the constant tendency to indulge in certain kinds of value
delusions and corresponding value judgements:~8
Scheler sees this ressentiment leading to a transvaluation of values. which results in the
denial of the existence ofan objective hierarchy of values."9 This is the origin. according
to Scheler. of the modem notion of the subjectivity of values. which he sees quite clearly
in Kant. The modem world. because of its transvaluation of value. is no longer capable
of seeing the intrinsic quality in life itself; rather. everything gets subordinated to utility.
Every individual's existence requires justification by way of their degree of usefulness
for a larger group.50
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In this modem society. the human must adapt ··.. .to the mechanism of utilitarian
civilisation and the human activity it happens to require at the moment....51 This
-,
description is close to Ellurs examination of The TechnoloKic:al Society. J. according to
which it is not the machine that has been adapted to the human. but rather the other way
around. Various techniques for the adaptation of human to machine have developed in
modem society: technique represents any complex standardised means for attaining a
predetermined result. It is the method whereby spontaneous and unrenective activity is
converted to deliberate and rationalised behaviour. When humans are viewed as material
for the technological system rather than valuable in their own right. then they are molded
so as to fit the current needs of that system. There is no support. then. for retlections
upon that social system. but only ways ofadapting humans to the system. Some
examples of the application of technique to humans for the purpose of socio-technical
adaptation can be observed in public education. medicine. and advertising. These
techniques are used to overcome what Leonard J. Waks. in an analysis of Ellul. calls the
"human barrier:' The human barrier is what has been reached when individuals refuse
further regimentation and run away. revolt. or break downY These techniques are
prostheses in the negative form as their purpose is to replace the human sensibility. which
leads to protest or exhaustion. with a willing conformity to technical demands.
The machine is seen to hold intrinsic value. More and more western society
values individuals who represent a detached rationality and are unhindered by emotional
attachments to others. or to the earth. Ellul terms this form of human the "joyous
robot:,5~When we cease to value tools for connecting us to the world. then tools become
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part of us. such that we are no longer capable ofattending to. nor assessing. them. When
we become tools. when the technologies we use are substitutes for our humanity. and we
are reduced to our functionality. our utility to a system. then we are dealing with
prostheses.
29
Chapter 4: The Effects of Prosthesis on Personhood
Prosthesis. in inhibiting our sensibility. endangers personhood because value
experiences. which are necessary for ethical considerations and actions. are less possible.
Prosthesis is inhibitory because it has its origins in a will to control. which is closed to the
world. rather than an attitude of love. which is open. The more technology is viewed as
the highest expression of humanity the more the natural world is stripped of any
significance other than utility. When nature comes to be seen as raw material for human
purposes it is approached with an attitude of hostility or control. This attitude ofcontrol
--
hinders any possibility for insight into the value of that world." An attitude of hostility
(which is seen in Kant's distrust of the given as chaos)56 may be equated with the will-to-
control. and has its opposite in an attitude of love. These two opposed stances toward the
world make up what Scheler refers to as the foundations for the two attitudes of
cognition. 57 Both technology and Kant's primacy of the moral ought are seen by Scheler
to be results of the will to control.
Humans approach nature. according to such a will. with their intellect. which
seeks to impose order upon its field ofexperience. rather than with an openness to
experience connected with an attitude of love. When reason is split from the emotions
everything gets subordinated to it; thus. technique. with its statistical proof of rationality.
cannot be refused unless one refuses to acknowledge reason as the sole ruler of
humankind. Herbert Marcuse describes this new perception of nature as ·· ...a realm to be
comprehended and organized by Reason.·,58 He goes on to explain that humans have not
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escaped the fate which they assigned nature: civilization ,.... has treated Nature as it has
treated man - as an instrument ofdestructive productivity:·s9
Scheler's phenomenological approach places ethical consideration at the core of
the process ofdetennining what to control. His notion of phenomenology as a
"procedure of seeing,-60 is central to ethics; any decrease in "sight"" of this sort will lead to
an inhibition ofethical activity. Since ethical activity belongs to the sphere of the person.
hindrance of "sight"' is detrimental to the realm of personhood. Scheler holds that this
insight is achievable through an attitude of love towards the world. and is hindered by an
attitude ofcontrol. Prosthesis. when resulting from the privileging of utility over vitality,
originates from the will to control and may be understood as hindering insight into the a
priori realm ofvalues. thereby potentially inhibiting possibilities for ethics.
Of importance here. for Scheler. is that values must be felt: if not telt. then the
actions of the person may not be considered morally wrong. as moral liability is based on
a corresponding intuitive ability. This case is perhaps best illustrated by Scheler's
exclusion of the mad from the realm of personhood. When dealing with a person whom
we consider mad...,[w]e cease to see meaningfully directed intentions that end in his life-
expressions... 'understanding' becomes 'explaining': and the 'person' becomes a piece of
nature.,,61 The mad do not share insight with others. Without insight into the a priori. no
moral ought may be fonned. and no moral responsibility is possible.
Madness. in the reduction of persons by way ofexplanation in terms ofcause and
effect analysis rather than understanding.61 is similar to childhood. In the inability to see
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another way. childhood resembles an inability to see in the machine something that
resists. and consequently shapes, our will:
...[A] man is not of age as long as he simply co-executes the experiential
intentions of his environment without first understanding them. and as long as the
forms ofcontagion. plain cooperation, and tradition in a wide sense are the basic
forms of the transference of his own mental state to others. He is immature as
long as he plainly wills what parents and educators or anybody else in his world-
about want him to do without recognizing. in willing these specific contents. the
will of someone else or a person different from himself.63
When we accept technologies as prostheses without evaluation we are immature because
we recognize neither the will nor the intentions of someone else (e.g., if one allows the
television to dictate one's style ofdress. without also recognizing the intentions of the
television producers and advertisers):
The individual's way toward insight into values and their relations can still be
mediated by authority, tradition, and fidelity. His comportment nevertheless
remains autonomously evidential ifhe has clear insight into the different
cognitional values of these possible sources of moral insight. and if he respects
these sources - in addition to the source of his 0\\11 individual life-experience -
according to their evidential and general value.64
The individual maintains their moral autonomy if they have insight into the value of the
authorities and respect them.
Western technology. which constantly advances human power over nature. does
so not in the service of humankind but in the service of a mentality of control. and the
results are detrimental to the human species. This mentality, or in Scheler's terms.
attitude of control. has "freed" humans from Nature by alienating them from it.65 a
process which has served to alienate them from each other as well. The will to control
did not. because it could not, stop at nature but moves through individuals within society
by way of normalization. standardisation. and mechanization. The more mechanized
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society becomes. through greater and greater administration. the less of the person may
survive. As long as people are unable to differentiate between their o\\'n unique
experiences and the pre-fabricated experiences induced by society. the lesser are their
possibilities for attaining personhood.
As was discussed earlier. the tool signifies a bond between nature and humans.
The more humans see themselves to be separate and disconnected from nature. the less
they are aware of the connection between themselves and their tools. With this lack of
awareness comes an alteration of the perceived function of technology. and consequently.
an alteration of (the actual functioning) of the human. Technology only has value insofar
as it may enhance the vitality of the person. or procure sensuous pleasures.f>6 When more
and more tools become prostheses then it is as Ellul claims. and technique (which was
modelled from the machine) is responsible for adapting humans to machines and
integrating everything.67 Subsequently. not all humans may be considered persons in
Scheler's sense of the word. The more highly technicized society becomes. the less
personhood is possible.
The reason for the decline of personhood with the ingestion of machinic elements.
via prosthesis. is that the individual loses their moral sense. They become passive
towards their environment. unable to differentiate between their own will and the will of
another (the other. in this case. being a mechanical entity). Scheler sees this inability to
differentiate in children. and this is why he precludes them from being considered
persons in the moral sense.68 Those members ofcontemporary society that have given up
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too many tools in exchange for prostheses. and as such have been both standardised and
normalized. may also be seen to have been infantilized.
Scheler sees standardization as stemming from a disregard for "spiritual
individualism":
For the theories of Stimer. Kant. and their successors have at bottom the same
deficiencies: the disregard o/spiritual individualism and the assumption that
only the lived body individualizes the person. No wonder that this conception of
"drive individualism." so common in the realities of modem life. leads in/act to
something that is quite contrary to this kind of"individualism": large-scale
objecti\'e uniformity of the being and life of these "individualists" to the extent
that one can almost predict the nature and actions ofothers from only one
I 69examp e.
When persons are considered individuals solely because of their lived-body and not also
their spirituality. which is inclusive of ethics. aesthetics. and knowledge. then they will
tend to be much the same. If. however. one's preferences and experiences are included in
their individualization. then their actions will by highly unpredictable and their natures
quite diverse.
Prosthesis may be seen as a form ofdomestication. John A. Livingston compares
the actions ofdomestic animals to their "wild" counterparts. Domestic animals have
become deficient in their ability to communicate amongst themselves and are no longer
sensitive to "interspecies information exchange:·7o He thinks that this is a result of a
prolongation of infantality through the whole of the individual's lifetime. This curbing of
social maturity reinforces dependencies and wards off the formation of mutuality and
interdependence,71 which are "natural" developments ofany species. If we take his
model of domestication and apply it to contemporary culture we can see that dependence
on technology can break down personal interdependencies. prolong infantality, and
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desensitise individuals to worldly interconnections. The result of human technological
domestication is moral regression and alienation from the world: the only escape is.
perhaps. madness. Foucault describes this alternative as occurring
'" when man remains alienated from what takes place in his language. when he
cannot recognise any human. living signification in the productions of his activity.
when economic and social detenninations place constraints upon him and he is
unable to feel at home in this world. he lives in a culture that makes a pathological
fonn like schizophrenia possible ... because our culture reads the world in such a
way that man himself cannot recognise himself in it.72
When we transfonn all aspects of personal existence and experience into the language of
the machine (cause. effect. efficiency) we are depersonalized and accept our environment
like children. or attempt escape through madness. Either way. personhood becomes less
possible. Organic nature is no longer perceived to hold intrinsic value: it becomes merely
instrumental to human ends. Human ends are measured by reference to self-preservation.
"Whoever resigns himself to life without any rational reference to self-preservation
would. according to the Enlightenment... regress to prehistory.··73
As we have seen. the technological advancements associated with Enlightenment
philosophies did not give way unambiguously to greater freedom. and they promote a
worldview that focuses on the self. through self-preservation being the guiding principle
for human action. This focus on self. at the exclusion ofall other elements of the world.
alters perception of that world. We have seen this alteration in the notion of
instrumentality. The abandonment of metaphysics coupled with an increase in the
autonomy of reason leads directly to an utilitarian perspective on the world carried ~ithin
a mechanistic worldview. Everything becomes quantifiable. and only reason. which has
become synonymous with a calculating intellect (divorced from ethics and aesthetics).
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may decide the worth of this or that thing. The intellect knows no bounds. Any limit or
direction could only be achieved through a value-ception. Since the intellect is placed
prior to the emotions. the emotions are suppressed. and no perception of value is possible.
Humans approach nature. then. with their intellect. which seeks to impose order upon
nature. rather than with an openness connected with an attitude of love. which would
allow for value-ception. Without this value-ception there is no intrinsic worth of persons.
for when reason is split from the emotions everything gets subordinated to it. including
human life. And. thus. prosthesis of various sorts is presented as the only rational choice.
Now. when only what is useful is considered valuable we have a paradoxical
situation. When utility becomes the measure of all value. more time and effort is spent
on the production of useful objects. objects to increase enjoyment. What happens.
however. according to Scheler. is that the increase in useful objects leads to a decrease in
experiences of pleasure. life experiences become de-intensified and less enjoyment
results: "The abundance of agreeable stimuli here literally deadens the function of
enjoyment and its cultivation:·7-l This decrease in enjoyment does not. or has not. led to
an alteration ofapproach. but. rather. to an increase in production of those objects which
are mistakenly thought to lead to greater pleasure. For example. television in our culture
has become a surrogate for actual experience and personal interrelations. It morphs into a
prosthesis when people forget how to enjoy themselves without the aid of this device.
The same may be said about many forms ofentertainment. such as video garnes. movies.
"junkfood:' and recorded music. Every year more and more channels are available for
those hungry to plug into more television than they could ever possibly watch. This is
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obviously a result of the notion that television is enjoyable. and that more of it will lead
to greater enjoyment. (Note that this notion is based upon the belief that pleasure is
quantifiable.) This is a case of value-deception. occurring when a lower value. such as
utility. is chosen over a higher value. such as that of vitality. or spirituality.75
The decline in ability to experience pleasure with the increase in technology can
be seen to signal a greater difficulty in the ability to experience. which extends beyond
the sensuous realm. In fact. if we take Scheler's hierarchy of values. an inability to
experience pleasure would signifY an inability to experience any higher value as well.
Horkheimer and Adorno attribute this decline to the "over-maturity of society:'
Accordingly:
The more complicated and precise the sociaL economic. and scientific apparatus
with whose service the production system has long hannonized the body. the
more impoverished the experiences which it can offer.76
Since technology may be seen to impoverish experience. then the modes of
alteration ofexperience should be a major component in the evaluation of technology. A
major trend in contemporary society is to view technological experiences as equivalent to
non-technological experience. Thus going from horne to school is considered the same
by way ofcar as it is by way of foot. except that the car is faster. We fail to take into
account that the same excursion by foot leaves open a wider realm of possibilities for
interrelations. While walking one feels the wind. smells the surroundings. and
encounters people, animals. and a variety of things both organic and inorganic. While
driving one may observe some of these things but does not experience them in the same
way. The experience is less full, but more efficient:
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What is philosophically remarkable and evident even now is lhat there is a
widespread and easy acceptance ofequivalence between commodities and things
even where the experiential differences are palpable. People who have travelled
through Glacier Park in an air-conditioned motor home. listening to soft
background music and having a cup of coffee. would probably answer
affinnatively and without qualification when asked if they knew the park. had
been in the park. or had been through the park. Such people have not felt the
wind of the mountains. have not smelled the pines. have not heard the red-tailed
hawk. have not sensed the slopes in their legs and lungs. have not experienced the
cycle ofday and night in the wilderness. The experience has not been richer than
one gained from a well-made film viewed in suburban Chicago.77
The more we recognize the effects of technologies on our perceptions and experiences
the better we may judge when and where to utilize them. Returning to the car. if we need
to get to the school quickly then the car might be the best means of getting there. If.
however. we think it important to develop. nurture. and maintain relations with the places
we pass through. then we might decide to walk. Never walking to school means that we
do not really know what exists between home and school. as we have not experienced it.
Our knowledge is limited to what we can see through the car window while concentrating
on our driving.
Many people no longer conceive of travelling by other means. The car. in being
perceived as more efficient. is considered the best fonn of transportation. Consideration
ofefficiency has become the predominant factor in decisions regarding action and
precludes other factors such as health. personal interaction. aesthetics. and unique and
spontaneous experiences. When viewing things only in terms of efficiency we are not
fully using personal judgment. but only the "rational" element. We are considering the
world from a technological perspective and failing to attend to the multiple ways of
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experiencing the world. Subsequently. we fail to consider things from a personal
perspective. which may include efficiency concerns but is not limited to such.
The car is a catalyst for radical transfonnations in our environments (roads.
highways. parking lots); it has altered everyone's ways of experiencing the world and
interacting with each other. Our concern is with how the car affects how individuals
view the world. For example. what. in some cities. has become unbearable pollution.
most people recognize is connected with high levels of automobile use. Few people.
however. alter their actions so as to reduce their contribution to pollution. Pollution is
seen to be a "necessary evil:' the "cost of progress:' In other words. the negative effects
ofour technological actions are viewed as necessary conditions. We seek to "control"
the world. but not our technologies. This orientation towards technology is a type of
addiction.
When we judge technology solely by the criteria ofefficiency. then we are
judging it by way of technological thought. rather than personal. community. or social
values. Technologies become for us prostheses. in that we allow our experience of the
world to be both shaped. and narrowed. by them. The problem with this is that we are
taking up the world prosthetically without making a distinction between prosthetic and
non-mediated experience. When we experience the world predominantly through various
prostheses we do not cultivate our personhood with fuller experiences.
39
Chapter 5: Experience, Imagination, and the Ethical Organ
.. Why have we submitted to a society that tries to make imagination a privilege when to
each ofus it comes as a birthright? ..78
Technological society promotes prosthetic conditions which make meaningful and
spontaneous experiences less possible. As our sensorial capacities are constrained by
prostheses we are losing the insight we need to develop ourselves as persons. When we
rely on prosthesis to experience for us. then we do not strengthen our personal sense and
judgement. Prosthetic dependence has weakened our judgement. We are immature. in
Scheler's sense. in that we are unable to differentiate between our O"TI will and the will
ofanother. Also. we are overly mature in that we are rigid in our perceptions. These
conditions are detrimental from the perspective of personhood. The positive social
conditions for personhood would promote youthful experiencing and mature judgement.
the opposite of what is currently promoted.
There is much. then. that we may learn from the child's ability to perceive the
world as a totality ofessences and interconnections. Perception of the world as whole.
full. and interconnected. enables a wide range of possible experiences as there is a great
variety of things to sense and ways to sense them. This type of perception is something
which is lost with the over-training of our minds and senses. This training occurs through
the ingestion of technique, which strips us of our ability to experience the world in a fresh
way, and inhibits our moral development. We are left with the problem of how to
achieve a child's insight in order for us to achieve. or retain. moral agency. while at the
same time developing our judgement.
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Phenomenological analysis ofconcrete experience shows the relevance of
childlike experience. Scheler contrasts the phenomenological approach with method:
A method is a goal-directed procedure of thinking about facts. for example.
induction or deduction. In phenomenology. however. it is a matter. first. of new
facts themselves. before they have been fixed by logic. and. second. ofa
d f . 79proce ure 0 seemg.
Children are open to new facts and have active imaginations. Imagination is a crucial
aspect of ethical insight and judgement. One must be able to conceive of things being
other than how they are in order to judge the value of present conditions. If the
conditions ofone's existence are perceived as static. determined by necessity. the
imagination is not active and value experiences that would lead to the establishment of
individual moral imperatives are less likely to occur. When necessity comes prior to
experience. then value-ception is hindered.
Scheler's notion of phenomenological experience is similar to the positive
elements of the child-experience in that both require an openness to the world. but
dissimilar in that the child lacks the possibility for morality. Scheler would like to give
us back the eyes ofa child. in order to be open. or be attuned. to the world. but within the
framework of a mind capable of conceptualising what ought to be. This
conceptualisation occurs within the realm of personhood. wherein moral acts are
possible.
Conceiving of the ethical capacity of humans in terms ofan organ is a useful
metaphor. since maintenance of this capacity requires nourishment and exercise. The
nourishment of our ethical organ is provided by experience. and its exercise is judgement.
The imagination aids the ethical organ by acting as a bridge between perception and
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conception: it enables the transformation of perceptions into creative conceptions. which
then allows for more diverse and unique perceptions. The less imaginative the
conceptual capabilities. the more the perception of the unique and diverse is filtered out.
or forced to conform to narrow conceptions of the world. Since our concern is personal
development. we must understand the importance of the imagination to this process.
In "Orchids and Muscles:' Alfonso Lingis expands upon the ideas of Andre
Leroi-Gourhan. and explains that the exteriorization of human organic functions has
historically led to the atrophy of the sensorial capacities of those organs. The harnessing
of motor power led to muscular atrophy. while reason. sight. and judgement were
strengthened in order to maintain surveillance:
Today our technological civilization has entered into an information-processing
revolution - which is also a new state of our biological evolution. Computers
henceforth assemble and evaluate data. and make the decisions. The faculties of
memory. reason. and decision - evolved in our nature through the history of our
civilization - now begin their atrophy.so
In line with the theory of prosthesis thus far advanced. we may see that what occurs with
prosthesis is the exteriorization of moral insight. Although we may not lament the
decline in our muscular capabilities. we have become conscious of our capacity to
influence the creation ofourselves: we are in a position to judge what changes to make in
our world given their consequences for the human species. Ethical atrophy would mean
slipping out of the realm of personhood. that place wherein we experience value.
understand and create meaning. and entertain the notion ofacting well.
Ethical atrophy is the danger which technological society presents to us. In
providing so much information on how to do this or that. by making explicit what one
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should do. by organizing our time and our lives into compartments. we risk losing our
capacity for moral insight through the surrender ofexperience by way of the prevalence
of clearly demarcated paths:
The scientific verification of experience which is enacted in the experiment -
permitting sensory impressions to be deduced with the exactitude ofquantitative
determinations and. therefore. the prediction of future impressions - responds to
this loss ofcertainty by displacing experience as far as possible outside the
individual: on to instruments and numbers. But traditional experience thereby
lost all real value ... experience is incompatible with certainty. and once an
experience has become measurable and certain. it immediately loses its
authority.81
Technological society. in providing us with a world wherein we find safety. presents us
with the danger of personal death. In fact. the only way to be safe is to be unable to
imagine. As long as one imagines. one understands the dangers inherent in life.
Learning to appreciate the importance ofdanger to life is part of personal development.
Definitive oughts to guide our actions face the problem of changing conditions in relation
to danger and death.
In contemporary technological society we increasingly rely on technology to
"experience" for us. Jeanette Winterson is concerned that the uniquely human may be
lost: "Not rationality. not logic. but that strange network of fragile perception. that means
I can imagine. that teaches me to love. a lodging of recognition and tenderness where I
sometimes know the essential beat that rhythms life:·82 She claims that our society does
not value the sensitive human. but. rather. sensitive machines. Sensitive machines detect
and process information. while sensitive humans feel and experience. These feelings and
experiences are the stuff with which one obtains insight and understanding into one's
world. oneself. and others. Conversely. machines obtain neither insight. nor
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understanding. but may be programmed to analyse and provide explanations. Always.
with machines. we are able to explain their functions by a cause-effect schemata. If we
reduce the person to a cause-effect schemata. we speak of the madperson. Valuation of
the sensitive machine. when conjoined with the devaluation of the sensitive human.
excludes personal thought. expression. and action. A function of technological society is
the disablement of the person via prosthetic dependence.
Contemporary society lacks imaginative capacity in that people are unable to
conceptualize other ways and other worlds of life. We decrease our capacity for value-
feelings as we become perceptually blocked by our prosthetic parts. This is how our
ethical capabilities are endangered. Formulation of moral oughts is integral to
personhood. but these imperatives are impotent unless we can feel first and cognize later.
Otherwise. as mentioned earlier. we risk falling into the position of Scheler's madman.
whose actions are reduced to explanation via cause-effect schemata. We should be
aiming towards Dewey's human plane where we examine our appetites and desires
within our reflective imagination. All these are necessary for personhood: technologicaj
society alters these human ways endangering ethical possibility.
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Chapter 6: Experience as Art
The contemporary reluctance to account for the importance of personal
experience may stem from the advent of modem natural science. It may be seen that
experience has been problematic ever since:
...[AJgainst repeated claims to the contrary. modem science has its origins in an
unprecedented mistrust of experience as it was traditionally understood. (Bacon
defines it as a 'forest' and a 'maze' which has to be put in order). The view
through Galileo's telescope produced not certainty and faith in experience but
Descartes' doubt. and his famous hypothesis of a demon whose only occupation is
to deceive our senses.gJ
Science locates experience in technology in order to make it verifiable. As we have seen.
however. verification is incompatible with the kinds ofexperiences necessary to persons.
Experience. then. needs to be removed from technology and returned to persons.
When value. as the stuffof ethics. is seen as separate from existence. the stuff of
science. then .....science...becomes brutal and mechanical.. :·84 Science. when used to lend
authority to law and separated from ethics. inhibits value experience: it promotes an
attitude of hostility and closes off the openness required for value-experiences. When
viewed as art. however. science contributes to value experience. as value would not be
judged as separate from existence and existences would be judged evaluatively.
Dewey defines art as any experience that is simultaneously instrumental and
consummatory. The separation of production and consumption. and the exaltation of
consummatory experiences. corrupts the meaning ofart and promotes the separation of
arts into the useful and the fine. Many of our activities. however. cannot go by the name
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ofart these include our labours and our enjoyments. Our labours are neither useful in a
meaningful sense. nor enjoyable: ··We bring into view simply their efficacy in bringing
into existence certain commodities: we do not ask for their effect upon the quality of
human life and experience.·085
Dewey contends that when science is divorced from art it invokes law and
necessity against the free and spontaneous.86 Accordingly. the individual is unable to see
their life in terms of art. or themselves as creators. Science replaces free. spontaneous
activities and experiences of individuals with laws and necessities taking the form of
standards and nonos. Science separated from art lends authority to the perception of
need for prosthetic alteration. Conversely. when science is art it ··...conters upon things
traits and potentialities which did not previously belong to them:·87 Science as art brings
into existence new possibilities for experience: it brings to light new material that is
useful for personal and social development. Conceived as art. science is enhancing.
When it hinders the individuars capacity for experience by applying law. then it
potentially diminishes personhood.
Contemporary society. by privileging the machine. disables people from
recognizing and consequently putting to use their creative capacities. Human life and
experience. as art. is empowered to ··...make the world a different place in which to
live.',88 The individual is an active participant in life and society rather than a passive
recipient of mechanized ideals. Art, receiving its power from the imagination.89
exemplifies the importance of the imagination to life and ethics.
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When means and ends are rejoined and the importance of their interconnection is
understood. then power and life are conjoined. Science is the knowledge of how to
transform certain natural states so as to yield new possibilities: when seen as art it is
recognized as having the power to transfonn reality. The actual transfonnation of reality
can be evaluated both as a process and as a finished object. Work is then rejoined with
enjoyment and meaning in human life. and becomes the creative construction of the
conditions of human existence. both individual and social. When work is not creative.
then power and life are divided. Life gets its power from art. and art gets its power from
the imagination.90 Imagination is the ability to conceive of things other than how or what
they are. Prosthesis replaces the imaginative capacity of people and inserts explanations.
statistics. and rules where understandings. metaphors. and possibilities used to be. In
other words prostheses tend to rigidify the conceptual abilities of persons by introducing
conceptions that seem necessary. When this occurs, the individuars conception of reality
is disconnected from their experiences: consequently their actions are not derived from
value experience. but from a socio-technical rule. When prosthetic dependence is too
great. the individual is thus denied their personal history as well as their connection to
social historv.
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Dewey sees the prevalent distinction between useful and fine arts. which he
maintains is a false division. to be illustrative of a larger social problem. [n order to show
the fallacy modem thought commits in this area. he contrasts it with Ancient Greek
thought, according to which experience is art ·•...born of need. lack. deprivation.
incompleteness." 91 Practical activity is thus viewed as inferior to theoretical activity.
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Dewey considers the Greek view to be self-consistent. and the modem view a ··...curious
mixture..." Modem thinking does not link nature and art; rather it sees science as ··.. .the
only authentic expression of nature. in which case art must be an arbitrary addition to
nature:·92 This theory fails to recognize .....the commonplace of Greek observation. that
the fine arts. as well as the industrial technologies are affairs of practice...93 In order for
modem thought to achieve a position of self-consistency it needs to recognize the
imponance of the practicaL generally conceived. and the subordination of theories to
practices. With our conceptions. the stuff ofour theories. we act in the world and thus
extend our perceptive capabilities. Participation is the aim of theory. Participation is
effective and affective participation - the ability to affect and be affected by our relations
with people. nature. and society. We are effective to the extent that there is continuity
between our perceptions and our conceptions. Our practice is enhanced when our theory
is informed by experience. The problem ofcontemporary society is that people have lost
their effective capacity because their individual experiences are unable to infonn their
theories and contribute. then, to their actions.
When people's work is divorced from their life. and is. thereby. neither
meaningful nor enjoyable, their enjoyments will tend to be merely fleeting pleasures.
having no utility in their self~development. Their experiences fail to become the material
or impetus for funher reflections and meaningful activity; such experiences merely aid in
the maintenance of passivity. This problem. which we have tried to show is prevalent in
technological society, is evident in the overwhelming separation of production and
consumption. People see themselves as playing double and disconnected roles as worker
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and consumer. People work in order to consume; they do not recognize the importance
of activity to the generation of meanings. thus losing control of the very meaning of their
lives.
When we recognize technology and technique as related to art. then we increase
our capacity tor judgement. Technology as art is good to the extent that it makes possible
future consummatory experiences and is enjoyable. When technology is not art.
experience is stifled: the individual swallows the pre-fabricated shells ofexperience of a
technological system. rather than being an active participant in their mode of
experiencing. Art enlarges people.9-land thus aids people in becoming through growth. as
opposed to being trained95 with the use of prostheses. This is the difference between
personal and mechanical judgement.96
As an example. consider Cooley. and his fellow workers at Lucas Aerospace. who
·•...evolved the idea of a campaign for the right to work on socially useful products:' 97 It
seemed absurd to them that they had skill. knowledge. and facilities that society needed.
.....yet the market economy seemed incapable of linking the two:·1l8 Their campaign.
convivial in nature. aimed to link workers and communities. An example of the sorts of
things that they began to do is the HOBCART. The HOBCART was developed after
some of the members visited a centre for children with spina bifida and saw that these
children could only propel themselves by crawling.
Mike Parry Evans. its designer. said that it was one of the most enriching
expeliences of his life when he carried the hobcart down and saw the pleasure on
the child's face. It meant more to him. he said. than all the design activity he had
been involved in up till then. For the first time in his life he actually saw the
person who was ~!Oing to use the product he had designed. It was enriching also
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in another sense. because he was intimately in contact with a social human
problem.99
The Lucas workers developed a series of products similar to this one in that they
link the designer. worker. and user. The HOBCART is an example of technology as art
since its design. construction. and use are each both instrumental and consummatory.
The designer enjoyed the process of making it. and the experience. as an enriching one.
will carry over to his future projects. One might be inclined to think of the HOBCART
as a prosthesis for the child who would use it. but it need not maintain this status. As was
said earlier regarding the artificial limb. it is a prosthesis until the individual learns to use
it. through the process of appropriation.
Now. our contention has been that prosthesis inhibits ethical capacity when
individuals substitute technical images. standards. and norms for the conceptual
culmination of their personal experiences without the realization that in the process they
are ingesting the will of another. putting themselves in service ofa technical end rather
than a personal goal. But. if we may see. with Dewey. that science and technology are
more properly conceived as arts. then the importance of the human imaginative capacity
and the value of individual experiences are maintained. Thus conceived. science and
technology serve life. specifically human life. by enabling the transformation of things
into things possessing more. and different. potentials. Science and technology as art
enhance human life by laying open the possibilities for creative and meaningful
endeavours. Without recognizing human creative capacity. individuals do not see the
importance of their emotions nor their experiences and are thus disconnected from the
material they need in order to determine their activities. As a consequence their activities
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cannot be said to be truly their own. as they are not freely engaged in. but done for the
sake ofan end which is only another means.
In technological society. activity is seen as work. but the necessity of work is
misconceived: it is seen as something from which escape is desirable. But a human who
doesn't work is inactive and passive. Passivity is seen as the privilege that technological
society offers. Rather than working to construct the components of their existence people
acquire them pre-fabricated. This is properly seen as the surrender of creative controL
which leads to a decline in personhood. As Harry Bravennan explains: "[n human work
.,. the directing mechanism is the power ofconceptual thought.. ..· 'OO When conception is
divorced from execution .....workers are reduced almost to the level of labor in its animal
form....·101 In order to conjoin power and life we need the conceptual capabilities of an
adult. but maintain some of the imaginative capacities of the child.
51
Chapter 7: Conclusion
Technological society. based upon the mechanistic view of the world. sees the
value of the person largely in terms of rationality. Such a view encourages prosthetic
alteration of the human being. It has been our contention that this fonn of alteration is
detrimental to individuals' capacities for ethical action. as differentiation between one's
own will and the will ofa technical system becomes problematic. The capacity for value-
ception is hindered by an overly strict schema ofconcepts that promotes hostility rather
than openness: individuals fail to bring their emotional experiences to their
conceptualizations and decisions regarding action as the relation between perception and
conception has been severed: they no longer exercise their creative conceptual capacities.
Conceiving of technology as art breaks the prosthetic bonds by validating
experience and enabling the individual experience of value to guide action. Value
deception is avoided as the imagination and the emotions are allowed back into our
conceptions of the person and thus technology is not conceived as "best". Both [van
lUich. in his notion ofconvivial tools. and Mike Cooley emphasize the importance of the
human creative capacity.
The person is conceived not solely as rational. but also as emotional. imaginative.
and creative. When conceived in this way. technology is conceived differently. and
consequently affects persons in a different manner. Rather than conceiving of technology
as that which works for us. we might see it as that which enables us to work well. This
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notion of technology has been present throughout our examination. and was embodied in
the notion of tool. Prostheses replace. while tools assist and enable.
lIlich's notion of"convivial tools" is consistent with the notion of tool we have
been developing in contrast to prosthesis. Convivial tools ··...allow the user to express his
meaning in action:· 102 and are opposed to the prosthetic template for action. Tools are
expressive~ understood thus. we may see how technology can be understood as an artist's
tool. lIlich contends that the problematic relation between humans and technology has
come from a mistaken notion of what technology is for. When technology is viewed as a
replacement for human slaves .....machines enslave men:· I03 This enslavement is in part
due to the surrender of the human creative capacity. which rests on experience. To get
beyond such a situation we need to have a society which does not promote the
mechanical replacement of human creativity.
One of the social factors which contributes to the replacement of the human
creative capacity. properly expressed in work and understood as meaningful activity. is
the entrenched separation of production and consumption in technological society. This
separation encourages the notion that work is done for the sake ofconsumption. and that
this consumption is separate from the work being done:
The idea that work. productive activity, signifies action camed on for merely
extraneous ends. and the idea that happiness signifies surrender of mind to the
thrills and excitations of the body are one and the same idea. The first notion
marks the separation of receptivity from meaning. Both separations are inevitable
as far as experience fails to be art: - when the regular. repetitious. and the novel.
contingent in nature fail to sustain and inform each other in productive activity
possessed of immanent and enjoyed meaning. 10.4
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The result of this separation is decreased meaningfulness of work and leisure. a decline in
experience. and a potential erosion ofethical capacities. "As the power of machines
increases. the role of persons more and more decreases to that of mere consumers.··\05
Hegel's lord and bondsman relation is useful for thinking through this situation.
It is the bondsman. through work. ·•...desire held in check. fleetingness staved otT....:· that
··...acquires an element ofpermanence:· I06 The bondsman "[i]n shaping the thing
creatively•... becomes aware of his own boundless originality:·107 In placing work into
the hands of another agency. the machine. humans. like the lord. lose their self-
consciousness. and become dependent on the machine. lOS The lord's position has been
misperceived as best. It is this movement which Illich thinks is the root of our
.,...accelerated crisis:· IOQ He claims that its resolution lies in the recognition ofa twofold
experiment which has failed:
For a hundred years we have tried to make machines work for men and to school
men for life in their service. Now it turns out that machines do not "work" and
that people cannot be schooled for a life at the service of machines. The
hypothesis on which the experiment was built must now be discarded. The
hypothesis was that machines can replace slaves. The evidence shows that. used
for this purpose. machines enslave men. Neither a dictatorial proletariat nor an
expanding leisure mass can escape the dominion of constantly expanding
industrial tools. I10
Illich thinks that society requires an inversion of the structure ofour technologies. and
this inversion implies both are-conceptualization of technology and a new distribution of
technology. including technique. Rather than allowing only a small group of people to
control the technologies and techniques of society (experts and specialists) the
distribution and use of technologies would be determined by political involvement. A
convivial society would limit those tools that would unduly sacrifice the capacity of that
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society to function in a convivial manner. This is in stark contrast to our current society
which is unable to limit technologies because technological progress has been
conceptualized as human development. Any limitation of technology. according to this
logic. would be a regression of humanity.
Illich's convivial society is the opposite of technological society. which rests on
notions of industrial productivity. inhibits personal experience and is. consequently.
detrimental to creativitv:
•
People feel joy. as opposed to mere pleasure. to the extent that their activities are
creative: while growth of tools beyond a certain point increases regimentation.
dependence. exploitation. and impotence. I [ I
lIIich's stress on the importance of creative activity to experience is in line with the
notion that the imaginative capacity of human beings is deeply connected with their
capacity to develop their personhood. Through creatively conceptualizing our emotional
experience we are able to translate these conceptions into creative activity. "Convivial
tools are those which give each person who uses them the greatest opportunity to enrich
the environment with the fruits of his or her vision." I 12
Cooley gives a detailed analysis of the problems posed by technology to the
human being through the alteration ofwork. He claims that the computer has become a
substitute for the human creative capacity in the field ofdesign. and has turned work into
mere routine. divorcing it from the human decision making process. and disabling the
possibility for bringing into existence the vision of the individual. I 13 In Cooley's thought
we see a reiteration of the connection between creativity and work. and the importance of
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work to persons:
...work is very important to people. Not the grotesque alienated work which has
developed over the last 50 years. but work in its historic sense which links hand
and brain and which is creative and fulfilling...We express ourselves through our
work. We relate to society through our work and we are creative through our
work. I 14
Cooley is highly critical ofsociety's depreciatory view of the human and its inflated view
of the machine. He considers this view as connected with a desire to diminish human
intelligence because intelligence ··...brings with it culture. political consciousness.
ideology and other aspirations. In our society these are regarded as somewhat
subversive. a very good reason then to try to suppress it or eliminate it all together..:· 115
Human intelligence. in so far as it is creative. is subversive. as it makes us able to see the
human as artist. or art maker. Art is a fonn of protest in so far as it is understood as the
··...process of making the world a different place to live in:· 116 When society is
technological in fonn it inhibits critical possibility and detaches the individual from their
power to create and transfonn the world. The result is a diminishment of the person. an
enlargement of the machine. and the disconnection of persons from their needs.
··... [PJersons need the freedom to make the things among which they can live. to give
shape to them according to their own tastes. and to put them to use in caring for and
about others:,117 A society which provides for this need emphasizes interdependence
and frees the human from their prosthetic domestication in the fonn of servitude to a
technical system
Cooley understands creative persons as those people who have an "open-ended
childlike curiosity:' are highly motivated, have a "sense ofexcitement" in their work. and
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possess the "ability to bring an original approach to problems:·118 Society. then. can be
understood as good to the extent which it enables people to develop into creative persons.
and in technological society we see several inhibitors to this process. many of which can
be understood in tenns of the prosthetic alteration of humans.
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